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Optimal discretionary monetary policy in the open
economy: Choosing between CPI and domestic
inflation as target variables




In open economy, a choice can be made between two measures of inflation for use
as a target variable: CPI inflation or domestic inflation. This paper considers
flexible and strict inflation targeting strategies and explores the circumstances
under which a domestic inflation target is preferred to a CPI inflation target. This
is done from the perspectives of the central bank and society as a whole.
The quantitative results of this paper indicate that under suitable conditions
the temporal properties of stochastic disturbances are instrumental in determining
which inflation target is preferred. The choice of target variable from society’s
viewpoint coincides almost perfectly with the choice of the central bank if the
utility of the representative household serves as the welfare criterion for society.
If qualitative aspects matter in the choice inflation target, then the role of
temporal properties of the stochastic disturbances becomes less prominent.
Policy conclusions are drawn with the help of a forward-looking model for a
small open economy. This model has proper micro-foundations and exhibits two
important features. First, the degree of openness affects the parameters of the IS
relation and, second, under domestic inflation targeting, the existence of a direct
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve impairs the perfect stabilising
properties of monetary policy in the presence of demand-side disturbances.
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Optimaalinen rahapolitiikka avoimessa taloudessa:
kuluttajahinnat ja kotimainen inflaatio vaihtoehtoisina
tavoitteina




Avoimessa kansantaloudessa voidaan valita kahdesta eri inflaation mittarista raha-
politiikan tavoitteena: kuluttajahinnoista tai kotimaisesta inflaatiosta. Tässä tutki-
muksessa tarkastellaan sekä joustavan että tiukan inflaatiotavoitejärjestelmän toi-
mintaa ja analysoidaan, missä tapauksissa kotimainen inflaatio on parempi raha-
politiikan tavoite kuin kuluttajahintainflaatio. Kysymystä tarkastellaan sekä kes-
kuspankin että koko yhteiskunnan näkökulmasta. Tutkimuksen kvantitatiiviset tu-
lokset osoittavat, että tietyissä tapauksissa taloudessa vaikuttavien satunnaishäi-
riöiden luonteesta riippuu, kumpi inflaatiotavoite on parempi. Yhteiskunnan valin-
ta ja keskuspankin valinta eri vaihtoehtojen välillä ovat melkein täysin yhtenevät,
jos yhteiskunnallisena valintakriteerinä käytetään edustavaa kotitalouden hyöty-
tasoa. Talouspoliittisia johtopäätöksiä tehdään odotuksiin perustuvalla pienen
avoimen talouden mallilla. Malli perustuu mikrotason käyttäytymiseen, ja sillä on
kaksi tärkeää piirrettä: talouden avoimuus vaikuttaa kokonaiskysyntäfunktion
parametreihin ja valuttakurssi vaikuttaa inflaatioon myös suoraan Phillipsin käy-
rän kautta. Viimeksi mainitun seikan vuoksi rahapolitiikka ei tässä mallissa pysty
täysin torjumaan kysyntähäiriöiden vaikutusta, kun noudatetaan inflaatiotavoittee-
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Few economists will take issue with the notion that by the end of the millennium
inflation targeting had become the dominant monetary policy strategy. The
countries that initiated the move towards inflation targeting in the late 1980s and
early 1990s were typically small open economies.
1 Due to their relatively large
trading sectors and the view that severe exchange rate fluctuations are disruptive
to trade, these countries defined the target for inflation in terms of changes in a
fairly broad price index, the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This index is broad in
the sense that it includes the prices of selected domestic and foreign consumption
goods. The extent to which the domestic currency prices of the latter are sensitive
to changes in the exchange rate depends on the degree of exchange rate pass-
through. If exchange rate pass-through is complete changes in the nominal
exchange rate lead to one-for-one changes in the domestic currency price of
imported goods. The overall effect of imported inflation on the CPI is then
captured by changes in the real exchange rate and the degree of openness.
The case for CPI inflation targeting seems to be overwhelming in light of
current practice. Indeed it appears to be so strong that there is no room for any
alternative inflation targeting strategy. Yet in open economies, central banks have
a choice between two measures of inflation as target variables: CPI inflation and
domestic inflation. The issue of whether monetary policy ought to be based on a
purely domestic measure of inflation in open economies has received some
attention in the recent literature. Indeed, Sutherland (2000), Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2001, 2002), and Aoki (2001) recommend that the policymaker target
domestic inflation. Using an extension of the Obstfeld-Rogoff model (2000),
Sutherland favors targeting domestic inflation as it helps stabilize wages in an
economy that consists of a flexible and a fixed wage sector. With no changes in
relative wages, the risk premium that workers in the fixed wage sector face is
minimized and overall welfare is maximized. CPI inflation targeting also
produces too little exchange rate volatility. Echoing Sutherland’s view but
employing a forward-looking New Keynesian framework, Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler also advocate domestic inflation targeting. They favor domestic inflation
targeting over CPI targeting as the latter impairs the adjustment of relative prices
that is necessary to effect desirable changes in real quantities. The real exchange
rate is to be accorded enough flexibility so that relative prices can change
sufficiently to keep real output at its potential level. By focusing on domestic
inflation only, the policymaker can bring about the desired flexibility in the real
exchange rate. A similar conclusion is reached by Aoki who also employs a
                                                
1 New Zealand, Canada, and Australia were among the first countries to adopt formal inflation
targets.8
forward-looking framework. In his view, policy is to focus on core inflation, ie
inflation in the domestic sector, as it is the only source of friction in the model.
Indeed stabilizing core inflation guarantees that the real exchange adjusts
optimally as well. Again, welfare is maximized under domestic inflation targeting.
Other contributions de-emphasize the desirability of domestic inflation
targeting. Svensson (2000) evaluates a number of different targeting strategies in a
small open economy setting that features forward-looking behavior, persistence,
and lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Strict and flexible
domestic inflation targeting as well as strict and flexible CPI targeting are among
the strategies compared. Svensson concludes that flexible CPI targeting is the
most attractive strategy for monetary policy as it limits the variability of domestic
inflation, CPI inflation, the output gap, the real exchange rate, and the policy
instrument. A similar conclusion is reached by Adolfson (2001) who examines the
implications of limited exchange rate pass-through for the conduct of monetary
policy in a forward-looking framework.
This paper attempts to provide a comprehensive assessment of discretionary
inflation targeting in the open economy from two different perspectives. The first
perspective assumes that the policymaker is free to decide whether to pursue an
inflation target that is defined in terms of domestic inflation or CPI inflation. We
first consider a scenario where the policymaker cares equally about the variability
of both real output and inflation in his objective function. We attempt to assess the
implications of pursuing this flexible inflation targeting strategy analytically and
with the help of a numerical solution technique. The analysis of flexible inflation
targeting is complemented by the analysis of another form of optimal, albeit
extreme form of inflation targeting, strict inflation targeting, where the
policymaker faces a similar problem of choosing between domestic and CPI
inflation as the target. The merits of the strict inflation targeting regime are also
evaluated analytically and numerically.
It is safe to say that most central banks do not enjoy discretion in the choice of
the rate of inflation that embodies the inflation target. In most, if not all instances,
the decision of which rate of inflation to target is handed down to the central bank
by government decree. Thus the second perspective is one where the central bank
is given the mandate to target a particular rate of inflation. In this context the
question that the policymaker must tackle is to decide between flexible or strict
inflation targeting.
What are the possible factors that may influence the decision to target
domestic instead of CPI inflation or pursue flexible instead of strict inflation
targeting? We identify two factors: the degree of openness of the economy and the
temporal properties of the stochastic disturbances of the model. The degree of
openness is chosen because it affects the structural parameters of the IS equation.
The distinction between white noise disturbances and persistent disturbances is
deemed important because of the forward-looking nature of the New Keynesian9
framework. If shocks are persistent, then the effect of current shocks on current
inflation and real output is augmented by forward-looking expectations. That is
because the current expectations of future inflation and real output (and the real
exchange rate) depend on these shocks.
Our examination yields a number of intriguing results. A critical factor that
influences the decision of a central bank to target domestic or CPI inflation is the
temporal property of the disturbances. We show that a flexible inflation targeting
strategy where the rate of domestic inflation serves as the target dominates a
flexible CPI inflation targeting strategy if all disturbances are white noise
processes. In case the disturbances exhibit persistence, however, flexible CPI
inflation targeting dominates flexible domestic inflation targeting. Under a regime
of strict inflation targeting, the pattern is exactly reversed. Strict CPI inflation
targeting is preferred to strict domestic inflation targeting in the event the
disturbances are white noise and strict domestic inflation targeting turns out to be
more attractive than strict CPI inflation targeting in case the disturbances are
persistent. This intriguing pattern arises because the temporal property of the
disturbances affects critically the ability of domestic and CPI inflation targeting to
stabilize real output. The table below summarizes the findings of this exercise.
The dominating inflation target appears in boldface.
Shocks Flexible inflation targeting Strict inflation targeting
White noise Domestic inflation CPI inflation
AR(1) CPI inflation Domestic inflation
We also address the issue of whether the choice of the inflation target by the
central bank is consistent with the preferences of society. If the utility of the
representative household serves as the welfare criterion for society, then the target
variable for inflation chosen by the central bank matches the preferred choice of
society.
Similarly interesting findings emerge from a scenario where the central bank
is obliged to target either domestic or CPI inflation. In the event the central bank
is instructed to target domestic inflation, our findings indicate that flexible
inflation targeting is preferred to strict inflation targeting provided that the
disturbances are white noise. For autocorrelated disturbances, the preferred choice
depends on the degree of persistence in the disturbances. The greater the degree of
persistence, the more attractive strict domestic inflation targeting becomes. These
results are established both analytically and numerically for a zero domestic
inflation target. A similar result arises in the case of a zero CPI inflation target:
strict CPI inflation targeting is preferred to flexible CPI inflation targeting for
highly persistent disturbances while flexible CPI inflation targeting dominates
strict CPI inflation targeting in case of white noise disturbances. The conclusions10
drawn about CPI targeting are not quite as strong as they are based merely on
results ground out by the numerical solution technique.
We complement the quantitative analysis with an alternative method that
takes qualitative aspects of target choice into consideration. The qualitative
method of performance evaluation finds the temporal properties of the stochastic
disturbances to be less important in determining the appropriate variable for the
inflation target.
All policy conclusions are drawn with the help of a model for a small open
economy where the real exchange rate plays a prominent role in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. In view of the importance of the real exchange
rate, this paper offers a somewhat different definition of the “direct” exchange
rate channel. In conventional models, the direct exchange rate channel is thought
of as operating through the CPI. As the exchange rate forms part of this index, a
change in the real exchange rate leads to a change in imported inflation and hence
to a change in CPI inflation under the assumption of complete exchange rate pass
through. Naturally this effect is also present in the current framework but it is not
referred to as the “direct” exchange rate channel. Instead, in the current paper the
“direct” exchange rate channel operates through the presence of the level of the
real exchange rate in the Phillips Curve. The real exchange rate enters the Phillips
Curve because domestic price setters take into consideration the domestic
currency price of import-competing goods when setting their prices.
The existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve has far-
reaching implications for the conduct of optimal discretionary monetary policy in
the open economy. First, the perfect stabilizing property of optimal discretionary
monetary policy in the wake of demand-side disturbances and exchange rate
disturbances under domestic inflation targeting disappears. Both domestic
inflation and real output deviate from their respective target in the face of such
disturbances. In conventional models such a response pattern occurs only if cost-
push shocks hit the economy. These insights are based on analytical findings.
Under CPI inflation targeting, the perfect stabilizing property fails to hold for all
stochastic disturbances even if the direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips
Curve is not operative.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we derive the
forward-looking IS relation and the forward-looking Phillips Curve from an
explicit optimization framework. Section 3 discusses the implications of choosing
domestic inflation or CPI inflation as a target under flexible inflation targeting. In
Section 4 we compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages of adopting
either rate of inflation as a target with the help of a numerical solution technique.
The merits of pursuing a strict inflation targeting strategy are discussed in Section
5. Section 6 ties together the different strands of the quantitative analysis. It seeks
to provide a rationale for the choice between a domestic and a CPI inflation target
and examines the extent to which the target variable chosen by the central bank11
overlaps with the choice preferred by society. In Section 7 we analyze the choice
of optimal policy from the standpoint of a central bank that is under instruction to
target a particular rate of inflation. Section 8 considers qualitative aspects in the
choice between a domestic and a CPI inflation target. Concluding comments
appear in Section 9.
2 The building blocks of a small open economy
model
The model proper consists of three equations: an IS relation that explains the
behavior of aggregate demand in the open economy, a Phillips Curve that
illustrates the price setting behavior of monopolistically competitive firms, and a
standard uncovered interest rate parity condition. This section provides a step-by-




Consumers maximize a lifetime utility function that depends on the consumption
level of the domestically produced final good and an imported final good.
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where    >  0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and C measures
aggregate consumption while 
h
t C  and 
f
t C  measures the quantity of the domestic
and foreign consumption good, respectively.
From the standard intertemporal utility maximization problem, the following
first-order condition obtains (lower case letter denotes deviation from steady state
value):
                                                
2 The contributions by McCallum and Nelson (1997), Gali and Monnacelli (1999), Svensson
(2000), and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) represent earlier attempts to model optimizing
behavior by economic agents in the open economy in ways that are directly comparable to the
microfoundations established in this section. The derivation of the IS curve in the current model is
in parts similar to that of Svensson (2000).12
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where ct denotes aggregate consumption and 
CPI
1 t t t E R     denotes the real rate of
interest, defined as the difference between the nominal rate of interest and the CPI
rate of inflation.
The intratemporal first-order condition yields the following relationship: the
demand for the domestic consumption good is proportional to aggregate
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 measures the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the foreign
consumption good. 
CPI
t p  and 
h
t p  are defined as the consumer price index and the
price of the domestic consumption good, respectively.
With  taken to equal unity, the consumer price index can be written as a
weighted average of the price of the domestic and the imported foreign
consumption good, respectively:
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f
t p  represents the price of the foreign consumption good, st is the spot exchange
rate at time t, defined as the units of domestic currency required to buy one unit of
foreign currency, and  denotes the weight of the price of the foreign good in the
CPI.
Substituting (2.4) into (2.3) yields the following expression:
t t
h
t c q c    (2.5)




t t p s p q    .
The next step consists of substituting (2.5) into (2.2):
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where yt is the real output gap and 
hf
t c  is foreign consumption of domestic goods,
ie domestic exports.
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After solving for 
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Next, substitute (2.10’) into (2.6):
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Expression (2.11) can then be substituted back into expression (2.7):
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Making use of equation (2.9), we can restate equation (2.12) as written below:
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where a1 = (1–) > 0





Equation (2.14) represents the open economy IS relation. The forward-looking
characteristic of aggregate demand is self-evident: current real output depends not
only on the current real exchange rate and current foreign real output but also on
their expected values next period. More specifically, the difference between real
output in the current period and expected real output in the next period depends on
the difference between the real exchange rate in the current period and the
expected real exchange rate in the next period. Exactly the same pattern governs
the response of real output to variations in foreign real output. The standard real
interest rate channel is defined in terms of expected CPI inflation.
It is common to interpret  as reflecting the degree of openness of the
economy. All structural coefficients of the IS equation are thus very sensitive to
the degree of openness of the economy.
Phillips curve
Monopolistically competitive firms aim to minimize menu costs weighed against
the cost of being away from the optimal price they would charge in the absence of
those menu costs. This optimal price is denoted p
OPT. As shown below, the price
setting behavior in the open economy differs from the domestic context in one
critical way: the optimal price that firms strive to attain responds to competitive
pressure abroad. The objective function faced by the typical firm is:
   

 
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where:
3
t is the total cost at time t
pt is the natural logarithm of the price of the domestic good at time t
p
OPT is the natural logarithm of the optimal price a firm charges.
 is the constant discount factor
c is the parameter that measures the ratio of the costs of changing prices to the
costs of being away from the optimal price
Et is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t.
                                                
3 For convenience we drop the superscript (“h”) on domestic prices.15
After taking and rearranging the first-order condition for the above cost-
minimization problem (where we have assumed  to equal one for simplicity), we
can characterize the relationship between past, current, and future price levels as:
  
OPT
t t t 1 t t 1 t t p p
c
1
p p E p p        (2.16)
Next we specify the optimal price p
OPT as
0 y p ˆ p t t t
OPT
t  	 
  	   (2.17)
where all variables are as previously defined. In addition:
t p ˆ  is the natural logarithm of the price charged by foreign firms at time t
t   is a stochastic disturbance.
The optimal price responds to changes in marginal cost. But marginal cost and
real output are positively related.
4 Hence is innocuous to replace marginal cost
with the output gap in (2.17).
So far our analysis of price-setting behavior has been very much in the spirit
of the closed economy “New Keynesian Framework”. In a small open economy,
however, the price-setting behavior of domestic firms also takes into
consideration developments abroad. Being a small player in world markets, the
typical firm is guided in its pricing decision by the prevailing conditions in world
markets. More specifically, there exists a benchmark price  t p ˆ  that the firm faces
in world markets. This benchmark price affects the optimal price charged by the
firm. Indeed, the firm adjusts its optimal price in line with the domestic currency
price of the final goods charged by its foreign competitors. Thus  t p ˆ  becomes:
t
f
t t s p p ˆ   (2.18)
where:
f
t p  is the natural logarithm of the price of the foreign good in foreign currency at
time t
Using this specification for 
OPT
t p , we can rewrite equation (2.16) as:
                                                
4 On this point see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). For the purpose at hand, there is no need to
model explicitly the determinants of marginal cost. What is important is that real output moves
proportionately with marginal cost.16
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If aggregated over all firms, equation (2.19) represents a Phillips Curve relation
for an open economy. The same equation can also expressed as:
t t t 1 t t t u bq ay E        (2.19b)
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Equation (2.19b) differs from the standard forward-looking Phillips Curve by
allowing the real exchange rate to affect domestic inflation directly. In the wake
of a depreciation of the domestic currency, domestically produced goods become
cheaper. Hence domestic production is stepped up. In addition, the domestic
currency price of the imported foreign consumption good rises. Both the rise in
domestic production and in the price of the import-competing good cause the
optimal price to increase. Facing an increase in the optimal price, firms raise the
price of their output so as to minimize the deviation between the actual price
charged and the optimal price. At the aggregate level, the increase in the domestic
price level causes the rate of domestic inflation to rise. Thus we observe the
positive link between the real exchange rate and the rate of domestic inflation.
The complete model
The model that will serve as the foundation for the analysis of the monetary policy
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Equation (2.20) represents the uncovered interest rate parity condition. Stochastic
disturbances have been added to the three relations to reflect the existence of
uncertainty in the economy.
5 The time series properties of these disturbances will
play a central role in our assessment of the different targeting regimes. In the case
of persistence in the disturbances, the degree of persistence is the same for all
disturbances and fixed at . More formally,
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3 Optimal discretionary policy: the case of flexible
inflation targeting
Central to any discussion of the properties of different monetary policy strategies
is the specification of the objective function that the policymaker faces. In the
literature it is standard practice to assume that society delegates its preferences to
the policymaker in the form of an objective function. We shall not adopt this
convention in the current paper.
6 Instead we will specify an objective function for
the policymaker that varies in accordance with the chosen strategy for monetary
policy and the target variable for inflation.
7
Unlike in the closed economy, in the open economy there is some leeway in
the choice of the appropriate inflation target. Either domestic inflation or CPI
inflation can be designated as the target variable for inflation. We will approach
the issue of choosing the appropriate target rate of inflation in the following way.
                                                
5 
f
t R , 
f
t y , and 
f
t   are considered to be exogenous stochastic variables. The home country is too
small to affect prices, interest rates, and real output abroad. For simplicity, we also assume that all
foreign shocks are independent of each other.
6 Blinder (1998, p. 6) goes as far as arguing that central bankers “must – in a figurative, not literal
sense – create their own social welfare function based on their legal mandate, their own value
judgments, and perhaps their readings of the political will.”
7 The discussion of the objective function for society at large is deferred until Section 6.18
Assume a scenario where the central bank is given a broad mandate by society to
ensure stability in inflation without causing unnecessary fluctuations in real
output. In the absence of explicit instructions the central bank is free to decide on
the choice of the appropriate inflation target. The central bank can thus base its
optimal monetary policy strategy on either domestic inflation or CPI inflation. In
order to make an informed decision about which rate of inflation to target, the
central bank must carry out a comparative analysis of the costs and benefits of
targeting domestic as opposed to CPI inflation.
To complete the design of its monetary policy strategy, the central bank is
required to state its preferences as regards inflation and output variability. We
envisage an environment where the central bank practices flexible inflation
targeting as both the real output gap and inflation enter its objective function.
There is increasing evidence that what central banks do in practice is aptly
described by flexible inflation targeting.
8
In the remainder of this section, we will investigate the properties of
discretionary stabilization policy under flexible domestic and CPI inflation
targeting.
3.1 Domestic inflation as a target in the objective function
The policymaker faces a standard objective function consisting of squared
deviations of the real output gap and the rate of inflation, respectively. The rate of
inflation is defined in terms of changes in the level of domestic prices. The



















All variables are as previously defined.  is the discount rate and  represents the
relative weight the policymaker attaches to the squared deviations of the rate of
domestic inflation. Equation (3.1) implies that the policymaker’s sole concern
                                                
8 Consider, for instance, the most recent policy agreement reached by the Minister of Finance and
the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. It stipulates that inflation is to be targeted over
the business cycle. The new arrangement provides the bank with more flexibility in setting the
course of monetary policy and allows the bank to pay greater attention to the state of the real
economy. A similar targeting strategy has been successfully employed by the Reserve Bank of
Australia and the Bank of England since the early 1990s.19
rests with real output and domestic inflation. Fluctuations in the real exchange
rate do not enter explicitly the loss function.
9,10
To set the stage for illustrating how discretionary policymaking in the open
economy is carried out, it is helpful at the outset to reduce the dimension of the
optimization problem to one involving only one constraint. A few simple steps
need to be taken. First, we solve the UIP condition for the real exchange rate and
substitute it into both the IS equation and the Phillips curve relation.  Next, after
substituting for the rate of CPI inflation in Equation (2.14), we solve the IS
relation for the expected real rate of interest  ) E R ( 1 t t t    .
11 Following this, we
insert the expression for expected real rate of interest into the Phillips curve
relation. The following expression results:
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When setting policy with discretion, the policymaker takes the expectations of
the endogenous variables yt, t, qt and the remaining terms as given.
12 Hence we
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where
                                                
9 Adopting equation (3.1) as the welfare criterion ignores the effects on welfare of changes in the
real exchange rate in the open economy framework. Including only real output and the rate of
inflation in the loss function is rather typical in the literature and thus facilitates comparing the
results of this paper to earlier contributions (eg Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999, 2001) or
Svensson (2000)).
10 The target level for real output is the potential level of output. The target for the rate of inflation
is assumed to be zero.
11 Update Equation (2.4) by one period and take conditional expectations. To obtain 
CPI
1 t t E    in
terms of expected domestic inflation and the expected change in the real exchange rate, simply
subtract Equation (2.4) from its conditional expectation and use the definition of the real exchange
rate. See also Equations (3.5) and (3.6).
12 Here we adopt the convention of describing the conduct of discretionary policy along the lines
of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).20
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Notice further that the objective function can be neatly broken up into two
separate components as future values of the endogenous variables are independent
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The problem of setting policy under discretion thus reduces to the following



























2 a  with  1 2 a a    and combining the first-order conditions produces a
systematic negative relationship between real output and the rate of inflation:
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The coefficient on the rate of inflation indicates the loss of output that the
policymaker is prepared to sustain if the rate of inflation exceeds its zero target
level.
What is striking about the above optimizing condition is the relationship
between the degree of openness () and the sensitivity of domestic inflation to the
real exchange rate in the Phillips Curve (b). The degree of openness matters only
to the extent that the direct exchange rate channel is operative in the Phillips
Curve. In case this channel is absent from the Phillips Curve, ie if b=0, then the
optimal relationship between real output and the rate of inflation is independent of
                                                
13 Future values of yt and t are not affected by policy today as the effect of policy is
contemporaneous and the absence of persistence in the endogenous variables.21
 and the same for both the open and the closed economy framework: – a.
14
There is a straightforward explanation for this result. Shutting off the direct
exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve enables the policymaker to offset any
disturbances arising on the demand side of the economy by simply adjusting the
setting of the policy instrument. Thus, demand-side factors should not have any
role to play in the determination of the optimal relationship between real output
and the rate of inflation. The degree of openness is, however, a characteristic of
the demand-side of the economy as it denotes the share of the imported foreign
consumption good in total consumption. Thus, if the policymaker is in a position
to offset any demand-side disturbance, then  should not matter in the
determination of the optimizing condition.
In the more likely case of b  >  0, the optimality condition depends on all
parameters – except a3 – of the model.
15
There are two further noteworthy results. The first result is related to the
stabilizing properties of optimal discretionary policymaking in the current open
economy framework.
16 The second result pertains to the nature of the stochastic
disturbances that hit the economy.
Combining the above optimizing condition with the Phillips Curve, the IS,
and the UIP relation allows us to solve for the reduced form equations and the
variances of the endogenous variables that appear in the policymaker’s loss
function. We solve the model under the assumption that all stochastic disturbances
follow autoregressive processes with the degree of persistence for all shocks being
the same and denoted by . In addition, we also present the case where all shocks
are white noise.
The two expected loss functions under a domestic inflation objective appear
in Table 1. We observe that the perfect stabilizing property of optimal
discretionary policymaking in the face of demand-side disturbances that is
typically found in models of both open and closed economies does not carry over
to the present framework. In the face of demand-side disturbances  ) y , v (
f
t t , a UIP
disturbance (t), and a foreign interest rate disturbance  ) R (
f
t , the policymaker is
unable to keep the real output gap and the rate of inflation at their respective
                                                
14 This is rather unlikely though as  c
1 b  . Thus c would have to become infinitely large for b to
approach zero.
15 The optimizing condition can be written in terms of all deep parameters of the model:
t f f 2 t
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, where all parameters are as previously defined.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































target. If all disturbances are autocorrelated, then a foreign inflation shock will
also cause the targets for output and inflation to be missed. In his attempt to offset
the impact of any one of the aforementioned disturbances on real output by
varying the nominal interest rate, the policymaker causes the real exchange rate to
change. The change in the real exchange rate in turn directly affects the domestic
rate of inflation in the Phillips Curve. Thus the policymaker sees himself
confronted with changes in both the rate of inflation and real output. Inspection of
the numerators of the coefficients of the variances of IS, UIP, and foreign interest
rate disturbances (and foreign inflation shocks if the disturbances are persistent)
reveals that the magnitude of b, which captures the potency of the direct exchange
rate channel in the Phillips Curve, is instrumental in transmitting the effects of
these disturbances on both real output and the rate of inflation. In short, all
disturbances that impinge upon the economy – not just cost-push disturbances –
cause the rate of inflation and real output to deviate from their respective target
and hence cause the variances of both variables to increase if a direct exchange
rate channel is operative in the Phillips Curve.
Examining the loss function for the case of AR(1) disturbances, we find that it
is positively related to the size of the persistence parameter . Again there is a
straightforward explanation for this positive relationship. The greater the degree
of persistence in the disturbances, the more closely the current expectations of
future values of both endogenous (and exogenous variables) follow their current
values. This property in turn implies that current real output and the rate of
domestic inflation react more sensitively to the disturbances that impinge upon the
economy. Hence both variables have a tendency to deviate more from their target
values, causing their respective variance to increase. What is striking, however, is
that the origin of a particular disturbance is crucial in determining the extent to
which the loss function increases as the degree of persistence in the shocks
increases. Closer inspection reveals that the loss function increases dramatically
as persistence increases because the increase in persistence augments the effects
of the variances of IS, foreign interest rate disturbances, UIP disturbances, and
shocks to foreign inflation. The variances of all these shocks – but not the












. For comparatively high values of  this factor tends to become
rather large. Thus in the face of rather persistent shocks we should expect to find
huge differences in the numerical score of the loss function compared to the case
of white noise disturbances.24
3.2 CPI inflation as a target in the objective function
Most central banks aim at ensuring stability in the rate of CPI inflation. Indeed,
the performance of central banks is judged in general on the basis of their ability
to keep the rate of CPI inflation within tolerable bounds.
17 Thus, a case can be
made for the CPI inflation rate to appear as a target variable in the objective
function.
The rate of inflation is now defined in terms of changes in the level of the
consumer price index:
) s s ( ) 1 (
f
t 1 t t t
CPI
t            (3.5)
Given the definition of the real exchange rate (qt) and the assumption of complete
exchange rate pass-through, the above can be restated as:
t t
CPI
t q       (3.6)
In view of the fact that the policymaker is concerned about stabilizing the rate of
CPI inflation, it is necessary to recast the model of the economy in terms of the
rate of CPI inflation. This is accomplished by solving the above definition of the
rate of CPI inflation for t and substituting the right-hand side of this expression
for t in both the Phillips Curve and the uncovered interest rate parity condition.
The amended equations take the following form:
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Again, the first step of the optimization routine is to reduce the dimension of the
problem. This is accomplished by following the same procedure as outlined in
Section 3.1. With the rate of CPI inflation rate entering the objective function, the
minimization exercise that the policymaker undertakes can be stated formally as:
                                                
17 See Siklos (1999) for a detailed description of the various ways in which central banks are held
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The minimization exercise gives rise to two first-order conditions. Combining
these first-order conditions establishes the following optimal systematic
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Comparing the coefficient on CPI inflation in Equation (3.10) to the coefficient on
domestic inflation in Equation (3.4), we observe that, ceteris paribus, the size of
the former exceeds that of the latter. A one percentage point increase in CPI
inflation evokes a greater negative response in real output than a one percentage
point increase in domestic inflation. This is an important result as it foreshadows
that focusing on CPI inflation as opposed to domestic inflation is associated with
greater fluctuations in real output.
Owing to the appearance of a lagged endogenous variable in the model (qt–1),
analytical solutions for the endogenous variables are difficult to establish in the
current context.
18 Nevertheless it is evident that the perfect stabilizing properties
of optimal discretionary policy fail to hold in the present case just as they fail
                                                
18 Due to the presence of a lagged endogenous variable (qt–1), the current expectations of all
endogenous variables for period t+1 depend on qt. This fact complicates the derivation of
analytical solutions immensely.26
when the policymaker targets domestic inflation. Indeed, inspection of Equation
(3.10) reveals that the focus on CPI inflation deprives the policymaker of his
ability to insulate the economy against demand-side disturbances even if the direct
exchange rate channel is shut off. Even if b  =  0, demand-side parameters are
involved in determining the optimizing condition adhered to by the policymaker.
To get a more concrete idea about the implications of selecting domestic as
opposed to CPI inflation as a choice variable in the optimization problem faced by
policymaker, we will resort to employing a numerical solution technique. With
the help of this tool we will evaluate the behavior of the endogenous variables, the
policy instrument, and the loss function for the two policy problems. The results
of this exercise are discussed in the next section.
4 Applying the numerical solution technique to the
optimal policy problem under flexible inflation
targeting: A domestic inflation versus a CPI
inflation target
19
To understand the consequences of framing monetary policy in terms of a
domestic inflation objective or a CPI inflation objective, it is essential to track the
behavior of the variables that the policymaker cares about. For the sake of
completeness and for the simple reason that the behavior of other variables may
be of interest to the policymaker, too, even if these variables do not figure directly
in the objective function, we examine the behavior of all endogenous variables of
the model as well as the policy instrument. This is done against the backdrop of
varying assumptions about two factors that may influence the choice of a
particular rate of inflation as a policy objective. The first factor is the degree of
openness of the economy. As shown in Section 2, the degree of openness is
instrumental in determining the response of real output to the expected real rate of
interest, expected changes in the real exchange rate and expected changes in
demand abroad. In addition, the degree of openness is an important factor in
pinning down the systematic relationship between real output and the rate of
inflation in the optimizing condition. The second factor is the temporal property
of the shocks that hit the economy. The two cases considered are white noise
disturbances and persistent disturbances. Throughout the analysis the following
values of the parameters and the variances of the stochastic disturbances are
employed:
                                                
19 This section draws on Dennis (2001) who has written an algorithm that produces numerical
solutions to the optimization problem under discretion. The algorithm has been adapted to fit the
models described in Sections 3.1. and 3.2.27
 = 0.5  =1 
f = 2 
f = 0.15 
f = 0.9  = 0.8
a = 0.25 b = 0.25  = 1 1
2
1      for
f f f y , , R , , v , u i         
The unitary weight on inflation represents the operational definition of flexible
inflation targeting employed in this paper.
In the case of persistence in the disturbances, the degree of persistence is the
same for all disturbances and fixed at  = 0.8.
The first step of the solution procedure is to rewrite the model in the
following form:
t t t t t t t t V A R E A R A Y E A Y A Y 5 1 4 3 1 2 1 1 0         A (4.1)
Yt = vector of endogenous variables in period t.
Yt–1 = vector of lagged endogenous variables.
EtYt+1 = vector of expectations of endogenous variables in period t+1.
Rt = policy instrument in period t (scalar).
EtRt+1 = expected setting of policy instrument in period t+1 (scalar).
20
Vt = vector of stochastic disturbances of the model.
Aj = coefficient matrices, j = 1,…5.
Solving the model for the endogenous variables produces solutions that depend on
the lagged endogenous variables and the exogenous disturbances:
t t t V H Y H Y 2 1 1    (4.2)
Hj = coefficient matrices, j = 1, 2.
The solution for the policy instrument also depends on the vector of lagged
endogenous variables and the exogenous disturbances:
t t t V F Y F X 2 1 1    (4.3)
Fj = coefficient matrices, j = 1, 2.
The variances of the endogenous variables and the policy instrument are the
diagonal elements of the respective variance and covariance matrix:
 
'
t tY Y E ΦY  (4.4)
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The algorithm described in the preceding paragraphs is applied first to the model
of Section 3.1 where the policymaker targets domestic inflation and then to the
model of Section 3.2 where he targets CPI inflation. In each case we examine the
sensitivity of the variances of the variables of the model to the specification of the
disturbances that impinge upon the economy: a distinction is made between the
stochastic disturbances following a white noise process and an autoregressive
process. Throughout the analysis the only structural parameter that is allowed to
vary is the degree of openness.
The presentation of the findings proceeds in two stages. In the first stage we
present the comprehensive findings in numerical form, arrayed in tables. In the
second stage, we use graphs to track the behavior of the two rates of inflation and
real output under varying assumptions about the policy objectives and temporal
properties of the stochastic disturbances. Graphs are also used to capture the
extent to which the variances of the real exchange rate and the nominal rate of
interest fluctuate.
The variances of the endogenous variables and the policy instrument for the
case where the policymaker targets domestic inflation appear in Table 2.
21 All
stochastic disturbances follow white-noise processes. As the degree of openness
increases from 0.1 to 0.9:
– the variance of domestic inflation decreases steadily except for  = 0.2
– the variance of real output decreases initially but then increases starting with
 = 0.4
– the variance of the real  exchange rate declines initially but then increases at
increasing rates at  = 0.4
– the variance of CPI inflation and the variance of the nominal interest rate,
respectively, steadily increases at an increasing rate
– the numerical score of the loss function initially rises, then declines, only to
rise again at  = 0.5
Table 3 presents the findings for the case when the policymaker targets CPI
inflation. All stochastic disturbances follow white noise processes. As the degree
of openness increases from 0.1 to 0.9:
– the variance of domestic inflation declines initially before it begins to rise at
 = 0.5
                                                
21 As 1, the standard discounted quadratic objective function can be expressed as a linear
combination of the variances of the variables that appear in the objective function. See the
appendix to Dennis (2001) for further details.29
– the variance of real output rises throughout while the variance of the real
exchange rate decreases throughout
– the variance of CPI inflation decreases at a decreasing rate
– the variance of the policy instrument decreases initially before it begins to rise
at  = 0.5
– the numerical losses rise throughout.
Several findings deserve mentioning. Except for   =  0.1 the variance of CPI
inflation is always lower than the variance of domestic inflation under CPI
inflation targeting.
22 Also, the variance of domestic inflation is now somewhat
lower than in Table 2. Thus, framing the inflation objective in terms of the CPI
buys not only much lower variability in the CPI but also in the rate of domestic
inflation. It appears that with increasing openness the policymaker can
progressively reduce the variability of the CPI inflation rate but only at the cost of
substantial increases in the variability of real output. The dramatic reduction in the
variance of the real exchange rate and the relative stability of the variance of the
policy instrument are additional benefits of concentrating on the rate of CPI
inflation. Both the real exchange rate and the nominal rate of interest tend to
fluctuate enormously if domestic inflation figures as a policy objective.
Nevertheless, for the chosen weight on the variance of inflation ( = 1), focusing
on the rate of domestic inflation leads to lower losses as the comparison of the
final columns of Tables 2 and 3 reveals.
Tables 4 and 5 contain the findings for the case where the disturbances exhibit
persistence. Not surprisingly, the variances of the variables are much larger if
shocks exhibit persistence than if shocks follow white noise processes. Table 4
contains the variances of the variables when the policymaker cares about the rate
of domestic inflation. As the rate of openness increases:
– the variance of domestic inflation decreases throughout.
– the variance of real output decreases initially before increasing at  = 0.6.
– the variance of the real exchange rate decreases at the outset but then
increases starting with  = 0.7.
– the variance of CPI inflation increases throughout while the variance of the
nominal rate of interest decreases throughout.
– the loss function decreases for all values of  but  = 0.9.
                                                
22 This implies that the covariance between the rate of domestic inflation and the change in the real
exchange rate is negative.30
Table 2. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under flexible inflation targeting:
The policymaker targets domestic inflation
Case I: All shocks are white noise
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) E(L) = V(yt) + V(t)
0.1 0.5560 0.2985 3.888 0.6550 3.236 0.8545
0.2 0.5669 0.2882 3.596 0.8627 3.282 0.8552
0.3 0.5660 0.2843 3.474 1.193 3.460 0.8502
0.4 0.5629 0.2861 3.507 1.686 3.771 0.8491
0.5 0.5577 0.2941 3.702 2.426 4.229 0.8518
0.6 0.5500 0.3094 4.090 3.558 4.875 0.8594
0.7 0.5396 0.3347 4.731 5.337 5.778 0.8743
0.8 0.5257 0.3756 5.731 8.204 7.058 0.9012
0.9 0.5066 0.4428 7.271 12.945 8.911 0.9494
Table 3. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under flexible inflation targeting:
The policymaker targets CPI inflation
Case I: All shocks are white noise
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) ) µV(π ) V(y E(L)
CPI
t t  
0.1 0.4583 0.4499 2.881 0.4600 2.342 0.9099
0.2 0.4050 0.5771 2.037 0.3718 2.006 0.9489
0.3 0.3837 0.6832 1.527 0.3010 1.934 0.9841
0.4 0.3777 0.7794 1.212 0.2433 1.940 1.023
0.5 0.3802 0.8757 1.006 0.1962 1.961 1.072
0.6 0.3883 0.9806 0.8651 0.1572 1.980 1.138
0.7 0.4008 1.101 0.7645 0.1240 1.993 1.225
0.8 0.4171 1.243 0.6898 0.0952 1.999 1.339
0.9 0.4376 1.411 0.6324 0.0696 2.001 1.481
Table 4. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under flexible inflation targeting:
The policymaker targets domestic inflation
Case II: All shocks are autocorrelated:  = 0.8.
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) E(L) = V(yt) + V(t)
0.1 50.938 26.862 116.463 53.902 35.293 77.800
0.2 47.774 24.284 106.334 54.002 33.589 72.058
0.3 44.929 22.567 98.972 54.727 31.772 67.495
0.4 42.406 21.556 94.049 56.181 29.877 63.962
0.5 40.168 21.183 91.378 58.512 27.906 61.351
0.6 38.140 21.454 90.902 61.921 25.837 59.593
0.7 36.199 22.456 92.680 66.663 23.629 58.655
0.8 34.134 24.386 96.857 73.012 21.219 58.521
0.9 31.574 27.599 103.587 81.132 18.525 59.17331
Table 5. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under flexible inflation
targeting: The policymaker targets CPI inflation
Case II: All shocks are autocorrelated:  = 0.8
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) ) µV(π ) V(y E(L)
CPI
t t  
0.1 41.081 30.834 102.396 43.225 34.505 74.059
0.2 31.411 31.604 83.059 34.631 31.866 66.235
0.3 24.405 32.563 69.471 28.021 28.912 60.583
0.4 19.206 33.689 59.786 22.804 25.846 56.493
0.5 15.246 35.049 52.823 18.566 22.816 53.615
0.6 12.164 36.744 47.838 15.032 19.903 51.776
0.7 9.733 38.902 44.355 12.010 17.151 50.912
0.8 7.813 41.680 42.064 9.367 14.593 51.047
0.9 6.329 45.274 40.759 7.006 12.261 52.279
Table 5 provides feedback on the size of the variances if the policymaker cares
about CPI inflation. As the degree of openness increases:
– the variance of domestic inflation decreases throughout.
– the variance of real output increases throughout.
– the variance of the real exchange rate decreases throughout.
– the variance of CPI inflation decreases throughout.
– the variance of the nominal rate of interest decreases throughout.
– the loss function decreases for all values of  except for  = 0.9.
The variances of all variables except real output decrease as openness increases.
Notice that the variance of CPI inflation exceeds the variance of domestic
inflation for all values of .
Comparing the contents of Tables 4 and 5 shows once again that focusing on
the rate of CPI inflation results in lower variability of the rate of CPI inflation
itself as well as lower variability of the rate of domestic inflation, the real
exchange rate, and the policy instrument. However, there is a cost in the form of
much greater variability of real output. Nevertheless, the sizeable fluctuations in
real output are not sufficient for the loss function of Table 5 to exceed its
counterpart in Table 4.
We now turn to a visual inspection of the variability of real output and the two
rates of inflation. Figure 1 tracks the behavior of the variances of the variables in
question under domestic inflation and for white noise disturbances. The degree of
openness does not materially affect the extent of fluctuations of domestic inflation
and real output. However, greater openness causes the variance of CPI inflation to
shoot up, ever widening the gap between the variances of CPI and domestic
inflation. Figure 3 presents a sharp contrast to Figure 1. It represents the case32
where the policymaker pays attention to CPI inflation and where all shocks are
white noise disturbances. Here we observe the gap between the variance of CPI
inflation and domestic inflation widening as well. However, CPI inflation
variability is now increasingly less than domestic inflation variability. Notice that
as the economy becomes more open, both rates of inflation remain well under
control while fluctuations in real output increase dramatically.
Figure 5 illustrates the case of flexible domestic inflation targeting in the
presence of AR(1) disturbances. Both the variance of domestic inflation and the
variance of real output actually decline initially as  increases. At higher values of
 the variance of domestic inflation continues to decrease while the variance of
real output begins to increase. As is the case for white noise disturbances, the
variance of real output is always less than the variance of domestic inflation.
Again, the variance of CPI inflation is always greater than the variance of
domestic inflation; the gap between the two variances widens as  increases.
When the policymaker targets CPI inflation and the disturbances are AR(1)
processes, he succeeds in increasingly mitigating fluctuations in both CPI
inflation and domestic inflation as the degree of openness rises. But there is a
substantial cost. For   0.2. the variance of real output lies above the variance of
CPI inflation and keeps on rising as the economy becomes more open. This case
is illustrated in Figure 7. Notice also that the variance of domestic inflation is
always lower than the variance of CPI inflation.
Figures 2, 4, 6, and 8 capture the behavior of the real exchange rate and the
nominal rate of interest under the varying policy objectives and assumptions about
the temporal properties of the stochastic disturbances. Analyzing the case of white
noise disturbances depicted by Figures 2 and 4, we find that both the variances of
the real exchange rate and the nominal rate of interest are smaller if the
policymaker’s attention rests on the CPI inflation rate. Notice also that the
variances of both variables increase in line with the degree of openness in Figure
2 while the opposite holds in Figure 4. A most dramatic difference between the
variances of the real exchange rate and the policy instrument is depicted by Figure
6. There we observe that the variance of the real exchange rate is more than three
times the size of the variance of the policy instrument. If disturbances are
autocorrelated, attention to minimizing fluctuations in the domestic rate of
inflation can thus result in dramatic swings in the real exchange rate. This
problem can be eased somewhat by the policymaker if he focuses his attention on
CPI inflation. Figure 8 illustrates this case. The variability of the nominal rate of
interest and in particular the variability of the real exchange rate are lower than in
Figure 6. Finally, for AR(1) disturbances we find the variance of the nominal rate
of interest declining throughout as the degree of openness increases irrespective of
which rate of inflation is chosen as a target variable. In contrast, the variance of
the real exchange decreases monotonically as  increases only if the policymaker
targets CPI inflation.33
Figure 1. The variances of inflation and real output:






























Figure 2. The variances of the real exchange rate and the
nom. rate of interest: domestic inflation in

































Figure 3. The variances of inflation and real output:



























Figure 4. The variance of the real exchange rate and the
nom. rate of interest: CPI inflation in objective






























Figure 5. The variances of inflation and real output:





























Figure 6. The variances of the real exchange rate and the
nom. rate of interest: dom. inflation in objective






























Figure 7. The variances of inflation and real output:


































Figure 8. The variances of the real exchange rate and the
nom. rate of interest: CPI inflation in objective





























5 Strict inflation targeting regimes
In the preceding section, we evaluated the implications of specifying the inflation
target in terms of the rate of domestic inflation as opposed to the rate of CPI
inflation for the endogenous variables of the model and for the policy instrument.
In doing so, we made the critical assumption that the policymaker cares equally
about the squared deviations of real output and the rate of inflation from their
respective target. In this section, our attention will focus on an extreme case of
optimal policy: strict inflation targeting. Under this regime the policymaker lets
the relative weight on inflation in the loss function approach infinity with a view
towards keeping the rate of inflation at its zero target level. While the obvious36
benefit of strict inflation targeting is the attainment of the zero inflation objective,
the obvious cost lies in the increased variability of real output.
As in the standard case of flexible inflation targeting (where =1), the
policymaker has a choice of defining the strict inflation target (where 	
) in
terms of the percentage change of the domestic price level or the percentage
change of the CPI. We begin our discussion of strict inflation targeting by
analyzing the case of domestic inflation targeting under the assumption of white
noise and autoregressive disturbances. A similar analytical exercise is undertaken
for the case of strict CPI inflation targeting but only for white noise disturbances.
The top panel of Table 6 presents the analytical findings for the scenario
where the policymaker pursues a strict domestic inflation target. The first row lists
the expected loss function under the assumption of white noise disturbances while
the second row contains the expected loss function for AR(1) disturbances. As is
the case under flexible inflation targeting, we find that under strict inflation
targeting and AR(1) disturbances, pronounced persistence in the disturbances
causes expected losses to snowball thanks to the magnified effect exercised by the
variances of shocks that impact on the IS relation directly or indirectly: 
2
v ˆ  , 
2
f R ˆ  ,
2
ˆ   , 
2
f ˆ   .
The results associated with strict CPI inflation targeting are arranged in the
bottom panel of Table 6. A tractable solution exists only for the case of white
noise disturbances. Interpreting the behavior of the variance of real output under
strict CPI targeting becomes rather difficult in light of the complexity of the
coefficients, in particular on the variances of the shocks that impinge directly or
indirectly on the IS relation. What becomes immediately obvious, however, is the
fact that under strict CPI targeting, the parameter b does not play as critical a role
in stabilizing the economy as under strict domestic inflation targeting. Even if the
direct exchange rate channel is absent from the Phillips Curve, demand-side
disturbances, exchange rate shocks, and foreign disturbances will affect real
output. As foreshadowed by the optimizing condition (Equation 3.10) under
flexible inflation targeting, the term b+2 is instrumental in determining the
stabilizing properties of strict CPI targeting, too.
Owing to the complexity of the results under strict CPI inflation targeting, it is
exceedingly difficult to determine with certainty whether strict CPI targeting is
preferred to strict domestic inflation targeting. The outcome of this comparison
must be established with the help of the numerical solution procedure. The
findings of this exercise appear in Table 7–10.37
Table 6. Two strategies of strict inflation targeting:
domestic vs CPI inflation
Strict domestic inflation targeting: 	
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Note: By setting =0, the reader can verify that the expected loss function under strict CPI
inflation targeting reduces to the expected loss function under strict domestic inflation
targeting. In addition, by using the parameter values that are listed in Section 4 of the
paper, the reader can establish that the above analytical results are consistent with the
results produced by the numerical solutions method.38
Table 7. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under strict domestic inflation
targeting:
Case I: All shocks are White Noise
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) ) µV( ) V(y E(L) t t   
0.1 0 2.504 7.487 0.1497 8.307 2.504
0.2 0 2.537 7.317 0.5853 8.278 2.537
0.3 0 2.543 7.255 1.306 8.349 2.543
0.4 0 2.519 7.298 2.335 8.519 2.519
0.5 0 2.467 7.450 3.725 8.794 2.467
0.6 0 2.387 7.721 5.559 9.187 2.387
0.7 0 2.284 8.127 7.964 9.717 2.284
0.8 0 2.163 8.698 11.133 10.416 2.163
0.9 0 2.035 9.479 15.355 11.332 2.035
Table 8. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under strict CPI inflation
targeting:
Case I: All shocks are White Noise
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) ) µV(π ) V(y E(L)
CPI
t t  
0.1 0.0580 1.738 3.525 0 3.376 1.738
0.2 0.1277 1.494 2.199 0 2.424 1.494
0.3 0.1860 1.376 1.563 0 2.151 1.376
0.4 0.2352 1.316 1.202 0 2.055 1.317
0.5 0.2783 1.297 0.9739 0 2.018 1.297
0.6 0.3175 1.312 0.8202 0 2.005 1.312
0.7 0.3542 1.360 0.7121 0 2.000 1.360
0.8 0.3897 1.440 0.6339 0 2.000 1.440
0.9 0.4248 1.554 0.5767 0 2.000 1.554
Table 9. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under strict domestic inflation
targeting:
Case II: All shocks are autocorrelated:  = 0.8
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) ) µV( ) V(y E(L) t t   
0.1 0 51.100 64.944 0.2598 5.603 51.100
0.2 0 47.152 60.428 0.9669 5.941 47.152
0.3 0 44.115 57.205 2.059 6.299 44.115
0.4 0 41.855 55.131 3.258 6.681 41.855
0.5 0 40.296 54.140 5.414 7.095 40.296
0.6 0 39.421 54.236 7.810 7.547 39.421
0.7 0 39.269 55.500 10.878 8.052 39.269
0.8 0 39.950 58.104 14.875 8.625 39.950
0.9 0 41.672 63.348 20.201 9.290 41.67239
Table 9. The variances of the endogenous variables and the
policy instrument under strict CPI inflation
targeting:
Case II: All shocks are autocorrelated:  = 0.8
 V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) ) V(π
CPI
t V(Rt) ) µV(π ) V(y E(L)
CPI
t t  
0.1 0.1599 54.441 55.490 0 6.072 54.441
0.2 0.4430 52.476 46.494 0 6.740 52.476
0.3 0.7597 50.692 40.508 0 7.091 50.692
0.4 1.085 49.258 36.353 0 7.266 49.258
0.5 1.425 48.272 33.470 0 7.346 48.272
0.6 1.783 47.822 31.558 0 7.373 47.822
0.7 2.173 48.007 30.451 0 7.372 48.007
0.8 2.611 48.953 30.072 0 7.357 48.953
0.9 3.119 50.822 30.405 0 7.341 50.822
The variances of the endogenous variables and the policy instrument for both
strict domestic and strict CPI inflation targeting under the assumption of white
noise disturbances appear in Tables 7 and 8. In stark contrast to flexible inflation
targeting, under strict inflation targeting a CPI target produces smaller
fluctuations in real output than a domestic inflation target. In addition, the
variances of all other variables except domestic inflation will be smaller under
strict CPI inflation targeting compared to strict domestic inflation targeting. By
targeting the CPI, the policymaker succeeds in limiting variations in domestic
inflation. In contrast, by targeting the rate of domestic inflation, the policymaker
loses the ability to control the CPI inflation rate, particularly in fairly open
economies (  0.5). Thus, in case the policymaker is set on keeping inflation at
bay at all cost, he will choose the rate of CPI inflation as his target variable.
Very different results emerge in the case where the disturbances exhibit a
fairly high degree of persistence. Comparing the variance of real output across the
whole range of permissible values for  in Tables 8 and 9, we observe that strict
CPI targeting causes greater fluctuations in real output and hence higher losses
than strict domestic inflation targeting. Also note that fluctuations in the policy
instrument are now greater under strict CPI inflation targeting compared to strict
domestic inflation targeting for   0.5.
23
                                                
23 For the sake of brevity, we do not present graphs that track the behavior of the endogenous
variables and the policy instrument.40
6 Domestic or CPI inflation targeting?
In this section we intend to analyze initially the findings of Sections 3, 4, and 5
with a view towards establishing the preferred target for inflation from the
perspective of the central bank. As indicated earlier, this paper draws a distinction
between the objective function faced by the policymaker and the objective
function faced by society. The latter part of the current section therefore discusses
the choice problem from the perspective of society and examines the extent to
which the choice of the targeting strategy by the central bank reflects the
preferences of society.
A succinct summary of the results of Sections 3–5, which are the outcome of
comparisons of the expected loss functions under the different targeting regimes,
is given by the table below. The target variable for inflation preferred by the
central bank appears in boldface type in the body of the table.
Shocks Flexible inflation targeting Strict inflation targeting
White Noise Domestic inflation CPI inflation
AR(1) CPI inflation Domestic inflation
A domestic inflation target dominates a CPI target if the central bank engages in
flexible inflation targeting and the disturbances are white noise. In the event that
the central bank pursues a strict inflation target then the CPI should serve as the
target variable provided that the shocks are white noise. Exactly the opposite
pattern emerges for persistent disturbances. The rate of CPI inflation is to be
chosen as the target for inflation if the policymaker is set on flexible inflation
targeting. In contrast, under strict inflation targeting a domestic inflation target is
preferred. Clearly, this intriguing pattern needs to be explained.
As we have recourse to analytical findings for both strict domestic and strict
CPI inflation targeting it is best to begin our discussion by scrutinizing the
response of real output to the disturbances of the model under this extreme form
of optimal policy. Consider the variances of real output under white noise
disturbances in Table 6. As already mentioned, it is virtually impossible to
establish analytically whether the coefficient on the variance of a given shock is
greater under strict domestic CPI relative to domestic inflation targeting.
However, we can get important feedback on the size of the coefficients of the
variances of all disturbances by simply drawing on the parameter values that were
chosen to solve the model numerically. For fairly representative values of the
parameters,   = 0.3,  a = b = 0.25,  we  get  the  following  coefficients  on  the








f R ˆ    
2
f y ˆ 
Strict domestic inflation
target 1.99 0.42 0.05 + 0.05 0.03
Strict CPI inflation target 0.43 0.72 0.09 + 0.09 0.05
It is readily apparent that the effect of cost-push shocks on real output under strict
domestic inflation targeting is much worse than under strict CPI inflation
targeting. At the same time, strict domestic inflation targeting insulates real output
better against IS, UIP, foreign interest, and foreign output shocks. There is a
straightforward explanation for the first result. Under domestic inflation targeting,
the cost-push shock hits domestic inflation directly, and the size of the cost-push
shock determines the extent to which the domestic inflation target is missed.
Hence a substantial change in the policy instrument may be required, which in
turn may cause a substantial change in real output. Under strict CPI targeting, the
cost-push shock hits the domestic component of the CPI. But the story does not
end there. The cost-push shock also affects the real exchange rate but in the
opposite direction of the change in domestic inflation. Thus, in the wake of a
positive cost-push shock, the domestic component of the CPI increases but the
other component, the real exchange rate, appreciates, ie decreases. Hence CPI
inflation does not stray as far from target. Indeed a smaller adjustment in the
policy instrument is required. As a result, there is a smaller output loss.
24
The other relevant piece of information concerns the size of the coefficients
on the variances of IS, UIP, foreign interest, and foreign output shocks. Under
domestic inflation targeting, these coefficients are relatively small compared to
the size of the coefficient on the variance of the cost-push shock. Under strict CPI
inflation targeting, the coefficient of the IS shock variance is larger than the
coefficient on the variance of the cost-push shock. Finally, notice that the
coefficients of the variances of IS, UIP, foreign interest rate, and foreign output
shocks are greater under strict CPI inflation targeting than under strict domestic
inflation targeting.
In summary, under white noise disturbances, the loss of real output in the
wake of a positive cost-push shock is large enough to make strict domestic
inflation targeting inferior to strict CPI inflation targeting.
In the case of AR(1) disturbances, inspection of the second row of Table 6
reveals that the variances of IS, UIP; foreign interest, and foreign inflation but not
                                                
24 This story is consistent with the response of the policy instrument when the model is solved
numerically. For the  chosen parameter values, the coefficient on the cost-push shock in the
optimal reaction function  under strict domestic inflation targeting is approximately five times the
size of the coefficient under strict CPI targeting.42













domestic inflation targeting. We would expect that the variances of these shocks
are multiplied by a similar term under CPI inflation targeting. We also found that
under strict CPI targeting and white noise disturbances, the coefficients on the
variances of IS, UIP, foreign interest rate and foreign output shocks were greater
than their counterparts under domestic inflation targeting. Thus, coefficients that
are larger to begin with are multiplied by relatively large numbers (under
domestic inflation targeting and   =  0.8 this number is 25). The resulting
coefficients are large enough to make the effects of IS, UIP, foreign interest rate,
and foreign inflation shocks big enough so that CPI targeting ends up being the
inferior strategy compared to strict domestic inflation targeting.
Under flexible inflation targeting, a domestic inflation target dominates a CPI
inflation target in case the disturbances are white noise. The principal reason
underlying this result is that the variability of real output is considerably higher
for a flexible strategy centered on CPI inflation compared to domestic inflation.
Indeed a flexible strategy that targets domestic inflation yields fairly stable
variances for both domestic inflation and real output irrespective of the degree of
openness. Notice that the variance of domestic inflation always exceeds the
variance of real output. Not so under a CPI target except for  = 0.1. In general,
the variability of real output and inflation under a CPI target is very sensitive to
the degree of openness. As openness increases, a reduction in the variability of
inflation is traded off for greater instability of the variance of real output.
The relative instability of real output under flexible CPI targeting is much less
apparent when shocks are persistent. The ratio of the variance of real output under
flexible CPI targeting to the variance of real output under flexible domestic
inflation targeting is always less than two. This contrasts sharply with the same
ratio in the case of white noise disturbances where it is always greater than 2
except for  = 0.1. The gain in relative output stability under flexible CPI inflation
targeting is accompanied by a continuously decreasing variance of CPI inflation.
Notice that a flexible CPI inflation targeting strategy is far more successful in
lowering the variance of the target rate of inflation than a domestic inflation
targeting strategy as openness increases. The superior control over the variability
of the target rate of inflation combined with the gain in relative output stability
accounts for why a flexible CPI inflation targeting strategy outperforms a flexible
domestic inflation targeting strategy when shocks are persistent.43
Maximizing the Welfare of Society?
A central question that that has not been addressed so far is whether the choice of
target by the central bank is broadly consistent with the preferences of society.
Examining this issue necessitates the specification of the objective function for
society at large. Under ideal circumstances, society would delegate its objective
function to the central bank and instruct it to maximize social welfare. In practice,
the representatives of society, lawmakers, do not provide the central bank with a
precise description of the preferences of society.
25 Instead, the central bank is
given a far broader and less specific mandate. Generally, central banks are held
accountable for ensuring a degree of price stability (defined as a specific
numerical target or a target range for the rate of inflation) that does not conflict
with reasonably stable employment or stable exchange rates over the business
cycle. Central banks thus enjoy some leeway in designing strategies for monetary
policy. This flexibility manifests itself in the central bank’s objective function
being different from that of society’s. In the current context, the differences
pertain to the distaste for inflation variability relative to output variability and the
target variable of inflation in the objective function. In view of these differences,
it seems important to ask to what extent the design and implementation of
monetary policy coincides with the underlying preferences of society. We shall do
so with the help of two different specifications of society’s objective function.
In the recent literature, the criterion that measures the welfare of society is
taken to be the utility of the representative consumer.
26 If steady state
consumption of the representative household serves as the measure of society’s
welfare, then the objective function that measures society’s losses in an open
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The welfare of society in the open economy depends on the same variables as in
the closed economy: the real output gap and the rate of domestic inflation.
However, characteristics of the open economy matter as well. The objective
function is scaled by (1–), the share of total consumption accounted for by
                                                
25 On this point, see chapter 1 of Blinder (1998).
26 See Woodford (2001) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
27 This is an adapted version of the objective function in the open economy model of Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2002). They derive the objective function as a second-order approximation of the
utility of the representative household.44
domestic consumption. In addition, the weight on domestic inflation (
s) is an
increasing function of the degree of openness ().
28 Let the dependence of 
s on 
be described by a simple linear relationship:
    
s (6.2)
 is a constant parameter that reflects the dependence of 
s on the deep structural
parameters of the model other than the degree of openness. Depending on the
weight of the base parameter , society’s weight on domestic inflation in its
objective function,  + , may exceed the weight of unity that the central bank
places on the rate of inflation in its respective objective function under flexible
inflation targeting.
29 In light of the sensitivity of the size of 
s to the value chosen
for , the latter is assumed to take on two different values: 0.5 and 1.
With society’s objective function expressed by Equation (6.1), we can now
proceed to examine whether the central bank, the agent, chooses the target
variable for inflation in a way that broadly reflects the objectives of society, the
principal. This is an easy task to accomplish. Take the variances of domestic
inflation and real output under both CPI inflation targeting and domestic inflation
targeting that appear in Tables 2–5 and 7–10, substitute them into society’s loss
function, and compare the losses under CPI and domestic inflation targeting. The
target for inflation that is associated with smaller losses for society appears in
boldface type in the table below.
                                                
28 Greater openness is presumed to exacerbate the costs of resource misallocation due to relative
price dispersion, which itself moves proportionately with the rate of domestic inflation.
29 It is important to note that the weight on the rate of domestic inflation in society’s objective
function varies in accordance with the degree of openness. In contrast, the weight on the rate of
inflation in the central bank’s objective function is fixed at one under flexible inflation targeting
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Shocks Flexible inflation targeting Strict inflation targeting
White Noise Domestic inflation CPI inflation*
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Shocks Flexible inflation targeting Strict inflation targeting
White Noise Domestic inflation CPI inflation*
AR(1) CPI inflation Domestic inflation
*except for   =  0.9 when losses under a CPI target are slightly larger than under a
domestic inflation target.
The welfare-enhancing choice of the target variable from society’s point of view
is the same for both values of  and coincides almost perfectly with the choice
made by the central bank. Society prefers a CPI inflation target to a domestic
inflation target under flexible (strict) inflation targeting provided that the
disturbances of the model are persistent (white noise). A domestic inflation target
is more attractive than a CPI target under flexible (strict) inflation targeting if the
shocks are white noise (autocorrelated) processes. All told, the central bank acts in
the best interest of society even though the objective function of the central bank
differs from that of society.
Earlier contributions to the literature define the objectives of society in a more
ad hoc fashion. For instance, Frankel and Chinn (1995) and Froyen and Guender
(2000) employ a standard quadratic loss function that consists of the squared
deviations of real output, the domestic price level, and the nominal exchange rate.
In the current context where the rate of inflation and the real exchange rate matter,
a loss function for society that is similar in spirit to the one employed by the
above-named authors is:
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In short, the squared deviations of all endogenous variables of the original model
appear as arguments in the objective function for society. The relative weight on
domestic inflation equals unity. The greater the degree of openness, the greater the
importance of the real exchange rate in determining the welfare of society. Hence
the relative weight on the real exchange rate increases in line with the degree of
openness of the economy. Just as the CPI does not explicitly enter the objective46
function expressed by Equation (6.1), the CPI does not form part of the ad hoc
specification. However, nearly all components of the definition of the CPI –
domestic inflation, the degree of openness, and the real exchange rate – appear in
the latter. If the ad hoc specification serves as the welfare criterion, then society
will express its preferred choice for the inflation target in the following way:
Shocks Flexible inflation targeting Strict inflation targeting
White Noise CPI inflation CPI inflation
AR(1) CPI inflation Domestic inflation         0.4
CPI inflation     > 0.4
If society’s objective function is represented by the sum of the squared deviations
of the endogenous variables of the model, then the choice of the inflation target
variable made by the central bank may differ sharply from the choice preferred by
society. Given white noise disturbances, under a flexible inflation targeting
strategy, society unambiguously prefers a CPI inflation target even though the
central bank pursues a domestic inflation objective. Moreover, the target choice of
the central bank – a domestic inflation target – is at variance with the target
preferred by society under strict inflation targeting and persistence in the
disturbances for  > 0.4. In the remaining two cases, society and the central bank
share a preference for a CPI target. Taken overall, based on the ad hoc
specification of its objectives, society prefers a CPI target to a domestic inflation
target. A domestic inflation target becomes unattractive from society’s perspective
because of the accompanying excessive variability of the real exchange rate. As a
result, the targeting strategy chosen by the central bank may not match the
strategy that society prefers.47
7 Strategy choice and the temporal properties of
the disturbances for a given definition of the
inflation target
The purpose of this section is to explore to what extent the temporal properties of
the disturbances matter in the choice between flexible and strict inflation
targeting.
Consider the realistic scenario where the central bank is instructed by
lawmakers to target either CPI inflation or domestic inflation. While the central
bank is not free to choose the definition of the goal variable, the central bank is
free to decide on the appropriate monetary policy strategy, ie the one that
minimizes its objective function. An important question that arises in this context
is whether the choice of the optimal strategy is independent of the temporal
properties of the stochastic disturbances. We shall attempt to provide an answer to
this policy problem by drawing on both the analytical results and the numerical
results presented earlier in the paper.
Table 11 presents the case where the central bank faces a zero domestic
inflation objective. The core of the table lists the preferred policy choice and
indicates whether the choice of strategy is based on analytical results, numerical
results or both. The presence of “–” means that the policy choice could not be
determined by the method in question. According to our analytical findings,
drawn from Tables 1 and 6, flexible inflation targeting dominates strict inflation
targeting when all stochastic disturbances are white noise. The denominator of the
loss function in the top panel of Table 1 is unambiguously greater than the loss
function in the top panel of Table 6. These findings are corroborated by the
findings based on the numerical solution method (last column of Table 2 and
Table 7, respectively). The dominance of flexible over strict inflation targeting
does not necessarily prevail in case the stochastic disturbances are persistent.
Comparing the expected loss function that appears at the bottom of Table 1 to its
counterpart in Table 6, we find that the dominance of flexible over strict inflation
targeting depends critically on the size of
2 2 2
2 2 2
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(7.1)
The greater the degree of persistence in the stochastic disturbances, the larger this
expression becomes. For rather persistent disturbances, this expression is greater
than one. In this event strict inflation targeting dominates flexible policy. This
result is confirmed by the findings based on the numerical solution method where
 is equal to 0.8. This intriguing result can be explained intuitively as follows.48
Under flexible inflation targeting the policymaker sets both real output and
inflation so as to minimize the objective function. The presence of both the
variance of real output and the variance of inflation in the expected loss function
is reflected by the term above (Expression (7.1)). As  increases, the variances of
both inflation and real output increase. Hence the above term increases in size.
Thus, the loss function is bound to increase faster under flexible policy than under
strict inflation targeting.
The policymaker faces a similar policy problem if he decides to target CPI
inflation. The findings for this case are summarized in Table 12. Due to the
complexity of the policy problem there are no analytical results. Therefore, the
issue of whether flexible inflation targeting is preferred to strict inflation targeting
is settled by applying the numerical solution method.  We observe that flexible
inflation targeting dominates strict inflation targeting in case the stochastic
disturbances follow white noise processes. In contrast, strict inflation targeting is
preferred to flexible inflation targeting in the event that the stochastic disturbances
are fairly persistent, ie   =  0.8. Again, the pronounced persistence in the
stochastic disturbances causes the variances of both inflation and real output to
snowball under flexible policy. Thus, expected losses rise faster under flexible
inflation targeting than under strict inflation targeting.
Table 11. A domestic inflation target
Analytical results Numerical results
Preferred policy
 = 0 flexible inflation targeting  = 0 flexible inflation targeting
 > 0 inconclusive  = 0.8 strict domestic inflation
targeting
Table 12. A CPI inflation target
Analytical results Numerical results
Preferred policy
 = 0 –  = 0 flexible inflation targeting
 > 0 –  = 0.8 strict CPI inflation targeting49
8 Qualitative aspects in the choice of an inflation
target
The analysis carried out up to this point has relied extensively on quantitative
evaluations of  objective functions. To round out the discussion, we will also
present qualitative evidence about the performance of CPI relative to domestic
inflation targeting. Due to its comprehensive nature, this comparison will be very
helpful in assessing the overall implications of specifying an inflation target in
terms of domestic or CPI inflation. The comparison takes a very simple form. For
a given targeting strategy (flexible or strict inflation targeting), we compare the
size of the variances of all endogenous variables and the policy instrument under
domestic inflation targeting to the variances in question under CPI inflation
targeting. The comparison is made for both white noise and persistent
disturbances and appears in Table 13.
30 The dominating target, ie the target that
produces a smaller variance, appears in the body of the table.
Under flexible inflation targeting, a CPI target yields smaller variances of the
policy instrument and all endogenous variances except the output gap irrespective
of the temporal properties of the stochastic disturbances. Notice further that the
variance of domestic inflation is lower under a CPI target than under a domestic
inflation target.
Under strict inflation targeting the results are somewhat different. A CPI
target dominates a domestic inflation target from the standpoint of output
stabilization provided that the disturbances are white noise. Under a strict regime,
the variance of the target rate of inflation is zero and thus lower than the
alternative rate of inflation. That explains why the variance of domestic inflation
is now lower under a domestic inflation target. Another marked difference
pertains to the behavior of the policy instrument. The variance of the policy
instrument is less under domestic inflation targeting for  < 0.6.
The qualitative rankings based on Svensson (2000) are added to Table 13 for
comparative purposes. They underscore the fact that the qualitative results
reported in the current section are very much in line with his findings.
31 The only
difference pertains to the variance of the real exchange rate under strict inflation
targeting. The similarity of the findings is remarkable in light of the absence in the
current framework of any transmission lags in the conduct of monetary policy, the
absence of any lags of inflation and real output, and slightly different
interpretations of flexible and strict inflation targeting regimes.
                                                
30 The variances are taken from Tables 2–5 and 7–10. Although the variances are by their very
nature quantitative evidence, the comparison of the variances is qualitative.
31 Svensson considers only AR(1) disturbances.50
In summary, the qualitative analysis establishes the clear dominance of a CPI
target over a domestic inflation target unless the variance of real output is of
overriding concern under a flexible inflation targeting strategy. The temporal
property of the stochastic disturbances is immaterial in establishing the dominance
of a given inflation target under flexible inflation targeting. Under strict inflation
targeting the temporal property of the stochastic disturbances is also less
important. It matters only for determining the choice of the preferred inflation
target from the standpoint of real output stabilization and, to a lesser extent, the
stabilization of the policy instrument.
The results generated by the qualitative analysis are congruent with those
established by the quantitative analysis from the perspective of society provided
that the ad hoc objective function serves as the welfare criterion and the central
bank pursues flexible inflation targeting. Sharp differences in policy prescriptions
arise between the qualitative analysis and the quantitative analysis, however, if the
latter takes the utility of the representative household as the welfare criterion.
Table 13.
Flexible inflation targeting
V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) V(
CPI
t  ) V(Rt)
White Noise CPI DOM CPI CPI CPI
AR(1) CPI DOM CPI CPI CPI
Svensson*
AR(1)
CPI DOM CPI CPI CPI
Strict inflation targeting
V(t) V(yt)V ( q t) V(
CPI
t  ) V(Rt)
White Noise DOM CPI CPI CPI CPI





DOM DOM DOM CPI DOM
Note:
CPI = CPI inflation
DOM = Domestic inflation
*Svensson’s quantitative findings, which are based on a given degree of openness
( = 0.3) and reported in Table 3 of his paper, have been converted to qualitative findings.
# This is the only instance where the degree of openness matters in determining the
qualitative ranking.51
9 Conclusions
This paper has considered four different targeting strategies of monetary policy in
a forward-looking small open economy model: flexible domestic inflation
targeting, flexible CPI inflation targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, and
strict CPI inflation targeting. The objective function that the central bank attempts
to minimize is composed of the squared deviations of the target variables from
their respective target levels. The central bank acts with discretion and chooses a
given strategy of monetary policy by assigning the appropriate weight to the target
rate of inflation in the objective function.
Against this backdrop, we initially compare CPI targeting to domestic
inflation targeting from the perspective of optimal flexible policy. Given the
central bank’s objectives, our findings suggest that in the forward-looking open
economy framework a flexible inflation targeting strategy centered on domestic
inflation is not necessarily superior to a flexible CPI inflation strategy. Whether a
domestic inflation target dominates a CPI inflation target depends critically on the
temporal properties of the stochastic disturbances. If the stochastic disturbances
follow white noise processes, a domestic inflation target dominates a CPI inflation
target. In contrast, if the stochastic disturbances exhibit persistence, then an
inflation target framed in terms of CPI inflation dominates a domestic inflation
target. The greatly improved stabilization performance of real output under
flexible CPI targeting helps explain why flexible CPI inflation targeting
dominates domestic inflation targeting in the case of persistent disturbances.
The evaluation of strict inflation targeting regimes yields just the opposite
conclusions. Comparing strict domestic inflation targeting to strict CPI inflation
targeting, we find the latter dominates the former in case the shocks are white
noise. The severe effect of cost-push shocks on real output under strict domestic
inflation targeting is responsible for this result. For autocorrelated disturbances,
however, strict domestic inflation targeting is superior to strict CPI inflation
targeting. This result is due to the magnified effect of persistent shocks that
impinge directly or indirectly on demand under strict CPI targeting.
We find that the targeting strategies pursued by the central bank are in line
with the interests of society if the objective function of the latter is based on the
utility of the representative household. A more ad hoc specification of society’s
objective function adduces much less support for the notion that the central bank
chooses the variable that serves as the target for inflation in line with the
preferences of society.
The paper also seeks to ascertain whether there exists a preferred policy
choice between flexible and strict inflation targeting in a scenario where the
government defines the target variable of inflation. Our analytical and numerical
results indicate that, in the context of domestic inflation targeting, flexible52
inflation targeting dominates strict inflation targeting for white noise shocks. In
case of AR(1) disturbances, the attractiveness of flexible inflation targeting wanes
as the degree of persistence of the disturbances increases. Indeed in case the
shocks are fairly persistent, strict domestic inflation targeting dominates flexible
policy. Less conclusive results emerge for the scenario where the CPI inflation
serves as the target variable. Our numerical results show, however, that flexible
inflation targeting is preferred to strict inflation targeting in case of white noise
shocks. The opposite holds in the event of fairly persistent autoregressive
disturbances.
The outcome of the quantitative assessment of the different monetary policy
regimes must be put into perspective. It hinges critically on the specification of
the objective function that the central bank faces. Only real output and inflation
appear in the objective function. Thus, the policymaker does not care about the
volatility of the policy instrument; nor does he care about the volatility of the real
exchange rate. Moreover, no allowance has been made for the possibility that a
change in the real exchange rate might change the target level of real output.
Despite these limitations, the quantitative analysis underscores the importance of
the temporal properties of the stochastic disturbances and the direct exchange rate
channel in determining the choice of the target for inflation upon which flexible
and strict inflation targeting strategies are based.
A discussion of qualitative aspects in the choice of an inflation target forms
the final part of the paper. This approach has the advantage of being more
comprehensive than the quantitative approach as it evaluates the behavior of all
relevant variables. The qualitative findings ascribe a much less prominent role to
the temporal nature of the disturbances in determining the choice of an inflation
target. At the same time, the qualitative findings lack the precise information
about the relative stabilizing properties of the targeting regimes that is inherent in
the quantitative approach.53
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